Ontario’s opposition parties again failed voters by prioritizing their own political brands over collaboration, handing Doug Ford another predictable victory.

Just two days after Ontario’s recent election, Queens Park political reporter Ahmad Elbayoumi tweeted about plans for a meeting between NDP MPP Catherine Fife and Ontario Liberal President Kathryn McGarry.

Their goal, reportedly, was to explore how opposition parties might avoid vote splitting and collaborate to prevent Doug Ford’s government from winning another term.

However, the timing and sincerity of these discussions raise significant questions. If opposition parties were genuinely committed to uniting against Ford, why did they wait until after another defeat to seriously discuss cooperation? Had they coordinated ahead of the election—by running a single anti-Ford candidate in each riding—they could have easily defeated him. Instead, their stubborn refusal to collaborate resulted in predictable electoral disaster.

The reluctance to unify wasn’t accidental but deliberate. Parties chose brand preservation over practical political strategy. Rather than pooling resources and candidates, each opposition group fiercely guarded its individual identity, resulting in widespread vote splitting and effectively handing Ford another term. This outcome was entirely avoidable and highlights a deeper problem: opposition parties find losing safer than the responsibilities and risks of governance.

Green Party Leader Mike Schreiner isn’t exempt from blame. Despite recognizing his party had virtually no chance of forming a government, Schreiner chose to prioritize the Greens’ small political territory instead of championing a unified front against Ford. Had he publicly supported strategic cooperation, he could have helped shift the political landscape. Instead, Schreiner and others maintained their silos, indirectly aiding another Doug Ford victory.

A straightforward solution exists. Opposition parties could have collaborated on a temporary anti-Ford coalition, ensuring just one viable candidate in each riding. After securing power, their first legislative priority could have been implementing proportional representation, permanently resolving the vote-splitting dilemma. Ironically, once proportional representation became law, these parties could comfortably return to their distinct identities without fear of enabling conservative victories.

Yet, parties consistently refuse such straightforward strategies. Losing is convenient. In opposition, parties can comfortably critique government policies, fundraise endlessly, and make promises without accountability. Winning demands actual governance, policy delivery, and exposure of potential weaknesses. Thus, losing becomes not just acceptable but strategically preferable.

This isn’t exclusive to Ontario—it’s prevalent across municipal, provincial, and federal politics. Center-left and progressive parties routinely prefer narrow defeats over the modest risk of genuine cooperation. Their failure to adopt even mildly progressive, coordinated strategies perpetuates conservative rule, even in ridings where the majority oppose conservative policies.

Ultimately, opposition parties know precisely what they’re doing. Their repeated losses aren’t accidents but outcomes of calculated self-preservation. For ordinary Ontarians, however, this political gamesmanship carries real consequences—policies impacting healthcare, education, housing, and employment. Unless opposition parties move beyond their individual interests and genuinely commit to unified political strategies, Ontarians will continue bearing the cost of their leaders’ calculated ineffectiveness.